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The management of accounting numbers:
case study evidence from the ‘crash’ of an
airline
Ann Jorissen and David Otley*
Abstract — Financial misrepresentation has usually been analysed by large-scale empirical research. However, the
generality gained from such an approach is at the cost of understanding the rich and complex nature of ﬁnancial
misrepresentation in real organisations.We adopt a case study approach to gain more insight into the incentives, embedded in
contracts, which trigger decisions to engage in ﬁnancial misrepresentation and the underlying elements of discretion in these
processes. In particular, we examine whether contractual incentives should be considered as endogenous or exogenous and
we take a more integrated and dynamic perspective than is typical.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate that in order to understand the decision processes of real managers it is necessary to distinguish
between negotiable and non-negotiable contracts of the ﬁrm. Using a multi-theory perspective we observe that the direction
of the causation assumed in the agency framework (i.e. contracts inﬂuence behaviour) is often reversed in the case of
negotiable contracts (i.e. managers inﬂuence contracts). The case ﬁndings also provide insights into a number of additional
variables which enlarge the discretion of a senior manager to engage in ﬁnancial misrepresentation. The manipulation of
accounting numbers can be achieved by many mechanisms which traditional methods based on accruals would not detect.
The use of a wider range of research methods is therefore desirable.
Keywords: earnings management; ﬁnancial misrepresentation; accounting choices; corporate governance; executive
compensation
1. Introduction
The primary purpose of ﬁnancial reporting is to
convey information on a company’s performance
and ﬁnancial situation to a wide range of people.
Management communicates much of this informa-
tion using accounting numbers, which are surro-
gates for the underlying events and transactions
which affected economic performance (Revsine,
1991). There is thus an incentive for managers to
misrepresent all types of accounting numbers
included in the ﬁnancial statements and the accom-
panying annual report so as to present ﬁrm
performance in a favourable light. In the wake of
recent corporate scandals, academic research into
ﬁnancial misrepresentation has intensiﬁed but it has
concentrated almost exclusively on the manage-
ment of earnings numbers, with most studies
examining the presence of earnings management
through the analysis of accrual decisions. The
observation that, in cases such as Enron,Worldcom,
Ahold and Parmalat, both earnings numbers and
balance sheet numbers were managed, underscores
the fact that ﬁnancial misrepresentation is broader
than just earnings management.
Studies on ﬁnancial misrepresentation mainly
use large scale empirical data to demonstrate that
accounting numbers are, or are not, being managed.
Most studies try to understand why managers
manipulate earnings, how they do so and what are
the inﬂuences and consequences of this behaviour
(McNichols, 2000). The management of balance
sheet numbers has received far less attention
(Shevlin, 1987; Ely, 1995; Bauman, 2003) and the
management of disclosure numbers has hardly been
addressed. Despite the research effort devoted to
this topic most empirical studies, usually based on
agency theory, still suffer from a number of
limitations.
An important feature of ﬁnancial misrepresenta-
tion studies, which regard the management of
accounting numbers as a reaction to incentives
embedded in the contracts governing the ﬁrm, is the
assumption that the contract and reporting set of the
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ﬁrm is ﬁxed (Schipper, 1989). The advantage of this
approach is that ﬁxed sets imply rigidities or
frictions which are an incentive for earnings
management. It is not uncommon that most studies
that use the agency paradigm consider the incen-
tives towards ﬁnancial misrepresentation of
accounting numbers as exogenous variables which
drive the ﬁnancial misrepresentation process. This
assumption permits a focus on ﬁnancial misrepre-
sentation as a response to environmental conditions,
but it precludes a dynamic analysis of the evolution
of contractual changes (Schipper, 1989).
More than 10 years later Fields et al. (2001) also
argue that limited progress has been made in
earnings management research. These authors
mention two reasons for this limited progress.
First, there have been few attempts to take an
integrated perspective on earnings management
(i.e. consideration of multiple motives and multiple
methods). Second, earnings management research
generally fails to distinguish appropriately between
what is endogenous and what is exogenous. This
latter concern is shared by Core (2001). The
majority of earnings management research assumes
the contractual incentives to be independent and
exogenous variables explaining the presence or
absence of earnings management and its magnitude.
Misrepresentation studies typically do not take into
account the possibility of the presence of endo-
geneity in the ﬁnancial misrepresentation process.
In case of endogeneity, ﬁnancial misrepresentation
targets shape the contracts governing the ﬁrm as
well as the contracting inefﬁciencies which create
managerial discretion. If endogeneity is present the
error term will be correlated with the explanatory
variable in ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
used to explain the management of accounting
numbers and will lead to biased estimators
(Chenhall and Moers, 2007).
In their review of earnings management, Dechow
and Skinner (2000) conclude that measures of
earnings management devised by academic
researchers have not been very powerful in identi-
fying the extent of the practice. They therefore
argue that a more fruitful way to identify ﬁrms
whose managers practise ﬁnancial misrepresenta-
tion is to focus on managerial incentives.
This study responds to this literature by examin-
ing the process of ﬁnancial misrepresentation from
an integrated (multiple incentives and multiple
methods) and a dynamic perspective. The overall
research objective is to shed more light on the
underlying processes which trigger the decision to
engage in ﬁnancial misrepresentation and the under-
lying mechanisms which support or facilitate it, yet
remain unexplored by traditional earnings manage-
ment research. This research objective is translated
in two speciﬁc research questions. First, we inves-
tigate which variables have an exogenous character
and which variables have an endogenous character
in the process of ﬁnancial misrepresentation. Insight
on the issue of endogeneity versus exogeneity will
help to reﬁne the empirical models used in ﬁnancial
misrepresentation research. Second, we investigate
whether additional variables supporting or facilitat-
ing earnings management can be found which
provide increased explanatory power.
In order to address these two research questions,
we use case data taken from two connected major
European airlines, the Swiss airline Swissair and the
Belgian ﬂag carrier Sabena, which both ﬁled for
bankruptcy in the autumn of 2001. These corporate
collapses, especially that of Swissair (part of
SAirgroup), came as a surprise to many people.
An investigation report, undertaken at the request of
the administrator of the SAirgroup,1 points to the
presence of unfaithful representation of the eco-
nomic performance in the accounting numbers:
‘The unconsolidated and consolidated ﬁnancial
statements for 1999 and, to a much greater
degree, for 2000, did not fairly present the
economic and ﬁnancial situation of the
SAirgroup.’
We therefore seek to analyse and explain how
such mis-statements came about. This paper distin-
guishes itself from other studies in two respects.
First, it uses a case study method in combination
with internal archival company data and public
information. A number of studies in the critical
perspectives literature (Benston and Hartgraves,
2002; Lev, 2002; Arnold and de Lange, 2004; Baker
and Hayes, 2004) and in the capital market based
stream (Lys and Vincent, 1995; de Jong, et al.,
2007) have also used a case study approach,
although all are based only on publicly available
ﬁnancial data. By contrast, following Wilson and
Shailer (2007), we opted for a case study based on
internal company data as it provides the opportunity
for a richer exploration of the interrelationships
among the variables which stimulate or inﬂuence
ﬁnancial misrepresentation and the processes which
are triggered by the decision to engage in it. These
relationships are a black box in most ﬁnancial
misrepresentation studies.
Second, this study uses a multi-theory perspec-
tive which explicitly considers the central role of
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top management in choosing to engage in account-
ing numbers management. Therefore, the case data
are analysed in two phases. In the ﬁrst phase we
analyse the data through an accounting literature
perspective. Subsequently we refer back to the
extant accounting literature in order to try to explain
the patterns we ﬁnd in the data. Not all observations
of the ﬁrst phase can be explained by the accounting
literature. Therefore in the second phase of the case
study we examine the case data through a manage-
ment theory perspective in order to generate
additional explanations. Based on Cyert and
March’s concept (1963) of bounded rationality,
Hambrick and Mason (1984) elaborated their
upper-echelons theory which suggests that an
organisation becomes a reﬂection of its top execu-
tives and that the characteristics and functioning of
the top management team have a great inﬂuence on
organisational outcomes. The combination of this
accounting perspective and management theory
perspective on the data results in a multi-theory
perspective on ﬁnancial misrepresentation.
The results of our study extend the literature in
two ways. First, by using detailed empirical docu-
mentation of the importance of each of the variables
at each point in the ﬁrm’s development, we gain
more insight in the relationship among all variables
involved in the process of ﬁnancial misrepresenta-
tion. The case method allows us to observe which
contractual incentives and which elements of dis-
cretion, created through inefﬁcient contracting,
have an endogenous character in the process of
ﬁnancial misrepresentation. We ﬁnd that incentives
embedded in negotiable contracts, governance
characteristics and ownership characteristics,
which have traditionally been regarded as exogen-
ous in the process of ﬁnancial misrepresentation,
can have an endogenous character. The case results
show that these variables, which are supposed to
affect ﬁnancial misrepresentation, themselves
depend on that outcome. Simultaneity is an import-
ant cause of endogeneity (Chenhall and Moers,
2007), and arises when one or more of the
explanatory variables are jointly determined with
the explained variable. The above mentioned vari-
ables (incentives embedded in negotiable contracts
and discretion resulting from ownership and gov-
ernance characteristics) have an endogenous char-
acter within the boundaries of the implementation
of the strategic choice of the Chief Executive
Ofﬁcer (CEO). Non-negotiable contracts and exter-
nally determined discretion (institutional variables
such as investor protection, risk of litigation and
often the quality of generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP)) remain exogenous to ﬁnancial
misrepresentation. This ﬁnding has signiﬁcant
implications for the conduct of large scale empirical
research, as current studies suffer from both omitted
variables and simultaneity.
Second, we identify a number of additional
variables which are used by management to enlarge
their accounting discretion. These variables include
the composition of the top team of executives,
organisational design, investment characteristics,
and the management control system. Different
aspects of the management control system can be
used to facilitate ﬁnancial misrepresentation
(e.g. the degree of centralisation, the division of
task responsibilities and the choice of the measures
used in the incentive systems). Finally, the ﬁndings
reveal that ﬁnancial misrepresentation can involve
all types of ﬁnancial and management accounting
information as well as strategic, investment and
operating decisions.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2
we introduce the research method applied in order
to address the two research questions of this study.
In Section 3 we review the literature and derive the
variables which guide the analysis of the case data.
In Section 4 the research data are presented. In
Section 5 the results of the ﬁrst phase and the
second phase of the case analysis are presented. In
Section 6 the results obtained in the two phases are
combined into a multi-theory perspective on ﬁnan-
cial misrepresentation. We conclude (Section 7) by
suggesting that research methods need to be
extended if they are to discover the different types
of manipulation of accounting numbers presented in
this paper.
2. Research method
We wish to examine the interrelationships among
some of the variables which stimulate and enhance
ﬁnancial misrepresentation using a case study. We
have opted for a case study approach as it allows
insights into management processes which are
difﬁcult to obtain using arm’s length methods
alone (Gephart, 2004) and can suggest new explan-
ations that have not been previously considered.
The framework for analysis of the case data will be
ﬁrst provided by the extant accounting literature
(ﬁrst phase) and second by insights from the
management literature (second phase). The com-
bination of the two phases will result in a multi-
theory perspective on ﬁnancial misrepresentation.
We introduce the research method in this section by
presenting the case company, the case data and the
research methodology. Subsequently we review the
literature which suggests some variables of interest
to focus on in analysing the evidence.
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2.1. The case company
In order to address our two research questions, we
need internal company data to study the processes
and mechanisms triggered by the decision to
manipulate the accounting numbers. SAirgroup
(former Swissair group) as the subject of the case
study was chosen for two reasons. First, the report
undertaken at the request of the Administrator of the
SAirgroup stated explicitly that in 1999 and 2000
the ﬁnancial statements (consolidated and uncon-
solidated) of the SAirgroup did not fairly present the
economic and ﬁnancial position of the SAirgroup.
This conclusion points to ﬁnancial misrepresenta-
tion of the underlying economic performance
through the published accounting numbers.
Second, we obtained unique access to internal
company data, which allowed us to study the
underlying processes which triggered the decision
to manage the accounting numbers and which
supported and facilitated ﬁnancial misrepresenta-
tion, processes which could not be observed using
public data alone.
In the period of our study, we distinguish the
following important events in our case company. A
year after Swissair acquired 49.5% of the Belgian
ﬂag carrier Sabena (May 1995), the company, now
SAirgroup, embarked on a corporate strategy, called
the ‘dual strategy’. This strategy was geared towards
growth in both the airline business and the airline-
support businesses. This growth strategy, realised
mainly through acquisitions, resulted in growing
ﬁnancial needs.
2.2. Case data
The data employed to analyse the research ques-
tions consist of archival data and interviews.
Different categories of archival data were used
(see Appendix A for a complete list) and this
provided an opportunity for triangulation (Miles
and Huberman, 1998; Yin, 2003). The internal
company documents we reviewed consisted of
minutes and accompanying documents of the most
important committees of the Swissair/SAirgroup
and the Sabena group, correspondence within and
between the companies, and contracts and agree-
ments signed between the Swissair/SAirgroup,
Sabena, and the shareholders. We had access to
reports requested by the Swissair/SAirgroup or
Sabena from various consultants and to the audit-
ors’ reports. Besides these internal private mater-
ials, we consulted the documents released to the
public by the SAirgroup and Sabena and reports
and books published on these businesses. A
number of interviews with some members of the
ex-management team of both airlines were also
held. Given the judicial enquiries around the
bankruptcies of both airlines, caution must be
exercised in the interpretation of these interviews.
The potential bias in national press reports also
requires to be recognised, but in aggregate this
information can yield important insights. Insights
derived from one source were always conﬁrmed by
information from other sources. Through this
triangulation exercise, we report only consistent
ﬁndings in our case analysis, having discarded non-
consistent results.
2.3. Frameworks for analysis
The case data were analysed in two phases. In each
phase an embedded design is employed
(Eisenhardt, 1989). This design implies that mul-
tiple levels of analysis are undertaken in each phase.
Following Miles and Huberman (1998), we
arranged the data into a condensed chronological
account. In the ﬁrst phase of the case research the
internal and external company documents were
extensively reviewed in order to collect information
on all the variables involved in ﬁnancial misrepre-
sentation, previously revealed by the accounting
literature. The case data are analysed in the ﬁrst
phase according to the directionality of the rela-
tionships assumed in traditional accounting
research.
Central to extracting evidence from case studies
is the replication logic (Eisenhardt, 1989). In this
ﬁrst phase of the case analysis, we used a multiple
case approach by considering each investment of
the SAirgroup in a foreign airline as an individual
case. Each case served to conﬁrm or refute
inferences drawn from the analysis of the choices
made in relation to the SAirgroup’s ﬁrst invest-
ment in Sabena (Yin, 2003). Accordingly, in the
ﬁrst phase of the case analysis we collected data
on multiple incentives, multiple choices and
discretion over a period of time. Once patterns
were detected, we referred back to the extant
accounting literature to seek explanations for these
patterns. Since the results of the accounting
literature did not provide sufﬁcient explanation
for all the observed patterns, we examined the data
again using insights derived from management
theories. In this second phase of the case analysis,
we introduced CEO characteristics and CEO-
succession, top team composition and the strategic
choice as potential explanatory variables. Finally,
through the combination of the results obtained in
the two phases of the analysis we are able to shed
more light on the directionality between the
variables involved in ﬁnancial misrepresentation
and on the variables employed to create the
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 6 of 38
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necessary discretion to engage in managing
accounting numbers.
3. Literature review
In this section of the paper, we review the literature
in order to determine the variables we will focus on
to address our research questions. The ﬁndings from
the accounting literature and the management
literature provide a multi-theory perspective on
the process of ﬁnancial misrepresentation.
Central in this study is the deﬁnition of ﬁnancial
misrepresentation. A deﬁnition of this concept (or
of accounting numbers management) is hard to ﬁnd
since most authors in the accounting literature
narrow the scope of ﬁnancial misrepresentation to
earnings management. However, Revsine (1991)
and Lee (2006) deﬁne the phenomenon from a
broader perspective than most. According to
Revsine (1991) there are incentives that motivate
various parties to misrepresent ﬁnancial events
since a primary purpose of ﬁnancial reporting is to
provide a basis for contracting and decision-
making. While the events that affect performance
often cannot be controlled, the way that people
perceive these events can be controlled.
Manipulating these surrogates provides decision-
makers with a means for inﬂuencing peoples’
perceptions of managerial performance (Revsine,
1991: 16). Lee (2006: 423) labels the management
of accounting numbers as ‘reporting deceit’.
Reporting deceit refers to any accounting or
disclosure practice that deliberately misrepresents
economic activity by enlarging or diminishing
corporate assets, liabilities, equity, proﬁts and cash
ﬂows reported in ﬁnancial statements. Both authors
refer to a managerial intent to mislead shareholders
and other stakeholders of the ﬁrm. This element of
managerial intent is also present in the widely cited
deﬁnitions of Healy and Wahlen (1999) and
Schipper (1989).
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999: 368)
‘earnings management occurs when managers use
judgment in ﬁnancial reporting and in structuring
transactions to alter ﬁnancial reports to either
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying
economic performance of the company, or to
inﬂuence contractual outcomes that depend on
reported accounting numbers.’ Schipper (1989:
92) deﬁnes earnings management as ‘a purposeful
intervention in the external ﬁnancial reporting
process, with the intent of obtaining some private
gain (as opposed to, say, merely facilitating the
neutral operation of the process).’ According to
Dechow and Skinner (2000: 238) the above deﬁn-
itions are difﬁcult to operationalise since they centre
on managerial intent, which is unobservable from
public data. However, access to internal archival
company data allows data onmanagerial intent to be
gathered and assessed.
3.1. Literature review: the analysis of ﬁnancial
misrepresentation through an accounting lens
(phase I)
Since the objective of this study is to examine the
incentives towards ﬁnancial misrepresentation and
the underlying processes from an integrated and
dynamic perspective, we review the literature on
incentives, methods used and available accounting
discretion. Although the impression management
literature and the business ethics literature could
provide additional insights as well, we do not
elaborate on their ﬁndings in order keep the
complexity of the case under control.
3.1.1. Incentives towards ﬁnancial
misrepresentation
The traditional accounting literature considers the
incentives embedded in the contracts governing the
ﬁrm as triggers to mislead the stakeholders. Since
the accounting literature distinguishes between
external and internal contracts, we ﬁrst review the
evidence found on incentives embedded in the
external contracts of the ﬁrm and then we focus on
the internal contracts.
Capital markets depend on information sources
and expect corporate ﬁnancial reports to represent
the economic activity of the ﬁrm through the
accounting numbers. Evidence is available that
listed ﬁrms have an incentive to show a recurrent
and increasing stream of earnings (Barth et al.,
1995; DeAngelo et al., 1996) together with low
earnings volatility (Hand, 1989; Bartov, 1993; Hunt
et al., 1995); to avoid small losses (Burghstahler and
Dichev, 1997) and to meet benchmarks or targets
(Degeorge et al., 1999; Kasznik, 1999). The
external contracts with shareholders stimulate man-
agement to communicate accounting numbers
reﬂecting the above mentioned patterns. Next to
contracts with shareholders, contracts with debt
holders also provide stimuli to management to
engage in accounting numbers management in
order to avoid the violation of debt covenants and
to obtain a favourable credit rating (De Fond and
Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994; Dechow et al.,
1996). Further research indicates that contracts with
regulatory authorities provide an incentive to
engage in accounting numbers management to
avoid regulatory intervention (Key, 1997; Han and
Wang, 1998) or to minimise taxation (Beatty et al.,
1995; Guenther et al., 1997).
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Financial misrepresentation is also stimulated by
the implicit and explicit internal contracts of the
ﬁrm. The threat of a performance-related CEO
turnover creates incentives to match industry per-
formance (De Fond and Park, 1997; Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1995) and stimulates new CEOs to engage in
big bath accounting in their ﬁrst year of ofﬁce
(Pourciau, 1993; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993;
Godfrey et al., 2003). Further, ample evidence is
available that reward and bonus plans, which
represent the explicit internal contracts of the ﬁrm,
can drive earnings management (Healy, 1985;
Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995;
Guidry et al., 1999; Bartov, 2001).
A common feature of all these studies in this
stream of research is to assume that the incentives
embedded in the contracts are independent vari-
ables that are exogenous in the process of ﬁnancial
misrepresentation.
3.1.2. Methods or choices used for ﬁnancial
misrepresentation
In order to study ﬁnancial misrepresentation, its
presence ﬁrst has to be observed. Apart from
distributional studies, which test whether the distri-
bution of earnings around benchmarks differs in
some predicted way from what would be expected
in the absence of earnings management
(Burghstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al.,
1999; Beatty and Petroni, 2002) most studies rely
for the detection of ﬁnancial misrepresentation on
the observation of the methods used to manage the
accounting numbers. In the extant literature two
broad categories of methods to manage accounting
numbers are distinguished, namely, accounting
methods and real or operating methods. A number
of authors label these methods ‘choices’. Dechow
and Skinner (2000) distinguish between accounting
choices and real cash ﬂow choices. These authors
further subdivide the accounting choices into within
GAAP choices and choices which violate GAAP.
Schipper (1989) also classiﬁes the methods in two
groups, namely, accounting choices and real or
operating choices. Fields et al. (2001) label all
methods employed to manage accounting numbers
as accounting choices. They deﬁne accounting
choices as any decision whose primary purpose it
is to inﬂuence (either in form or in substance) the
output of the accounting system in a particular way,
including not only published ﬁnancial statements,
but also tax returns and regulatory ﬁlings.
For the purpose of this study we distinguish, like
Schipper (1989) and Dechow and Skinner (2000),
between accounting choices and real choices. In
order to subdivide both types of choices or
decisions further we rely on Francis (2001).
According to Francis, choices to convey a message
or inﬂuence stakeholders, can be categorised into
the following groups: choices among equally
acceptable rules or methods; judgments and esti-
mates required to implement generally accepted
accounting rules or methods; disclosure decisions;
timing decisions of when to adopt a required
accounting rule; choices about display; aggregation
decisions; classiﬁcation decisions; decisions to
structure transactions in certain ways to achieve a
desired accounting outcome; and real production
and investment decisions.
In the extant literature most research uses only
one accounting choice, namely the presence of
accruals, as the dependent variable in order to detect
earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995;
Beneish, 1997; Mc Nichols, 2000). This observa-
tion implies that only ﬁnancial misrepresentation
executed through accruals management is well
studied. Only a few studies try to capture earnings
management by examining real operating decisions
(see Wayne et al., 2004; Roychowdury, 2006).
However, analytical studies (Ewart and
Wagenhofer, 2005) and survey research (Nelson et
al., 2002, 2003; Graham et al., 2005) provide
evidence that corporate management uses both real
and accounting choices to inﬂuence the reported
numbers. As a consequence, Nelson (2003) sug-
gests that detailed guidance in accounting standards
reduces earnings management achieved through
management judgments but increases earnings
management achieved through transaction structur-
ing or real decisions.
3.1.3. Discretion to engage in ﬁnancial
misrepresentation
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) suggest that ﬁnancial
misrepresentation occurs when managers exercise
discretion over the accounting numbers without or
with little restriction. Prior literature (both capital
market based literature focusing on inefﬁcient
contracting and the critical literature) has uncovered
different variables which loosen the restrictions on
top management to engage in the management of
accounting numbers. This research indicates that
the degree of ownership concentration affects the
nature of contracting and that accounting informa-
tiveness declines as ownership concentration
increases (Dempsey et al., 1993; Warﬁeld et al.,
1995; Donnelly & Lynch, 2002; Fan & Wong,
2002). Further evidence shows that institutional
characteristics such as the quality of accounting
standards (Pope & Walker, 1999; Ball et al., 2000;
Ali & Hwang, 2000), the degree of investor
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 8 of 38
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protection (LaPorta et al., 1997, 1998), the risk of
litigation (Ball et al., 2000; Leuz&Verrechia, 2000)
and the degree of enforcement (Hope, 2003) all
create opportunities for earnings management.
Research which focuses on board characteristics
and its relation to earnings management also
provides evidence that the quality of board moni-
toring is impaired by the presence of CEO-duality,
by the presence of interlocking CEOs and by the
presence of internal or grey directors (Boyd, 1994;
Beasly, 1996; Peasnell et al., 2001). The critical
perspectives literature concentrates mainly on the
contextual variables which facilitate or incite man-
agement to manipulate accounting numbers
(e.g. Briloff, 2001; Revsine, 2002; O’Connell,
2004; Benston and Hartgraves, 2002; Lee, 2006;
Williams, 2004). The results of this stream of
research emphasise the importance of improved
regulatory enforcement for the provision of better
quality ﬁnancial information to stakeholders. In the
extant empirical literature these contracting inefﬁ-
ciencies are considered as independent and exo-
genous variables which explain the presence or
absence of ﬁnancial misrepresentation and its
magnitude.
3.1.4. Framework for analysis based on the extant
accounting literature (phase I)
The ﬁndings of the extant accounting literature
provide the basis for the framework for analysis that
will be applied in the ﬁrst phase of the case study.
Since we wish to study the management of
accounting numbers by taking an integrated and
dynamic perspective, we consider the multiple
incentives which stimulate this process, the multiple
choices applied to obtain the desired accounting
numbers, and the available discretion which allows
ﬁnancial misrepresentation to happen. Figure 1
presents the relationship between the variables
involved in ﬁnancial misrepresentation according
to the bulk of the extant accounting literature. The
incentives embedded in the contracts of the ﬁrm
encourage management to publish accounting
numbers with speciﬁc patterns. These are the target
accounting numbers. This answers the question as
to why managers manipulate accounting numbers.
A reporting strategy which consists of accounting
and real choices will ensure that the published
accounting numbers equal or almost equal the target
accounting numbers. The accounting and the real
choices explain how management arrives at ﬁnan-
cial misrepresentation. The available discretion has
an exogenous character as well and indicates the
available managerial opportunity to engage in
ﬁnancial misrepresentation.
3.2. Literature review: perspectives from the
management literature (phase II)
All deﬁnitions of ﬁnancial misrepresentation
(including earnings management) point to the
central role of top management in these decisions.
However, the accounting literature has not taken
into account the heterogeneity among top managers
and its possible impact on ﬁnancial misrepresenta-
tion. The purpose of this multi-theory perspective
on the case data is to obtain a better understanding
of the process of managing accounting numbers by
combining insights from different perspectives (the
accounting literature and the management litera-
ture).
3.2.1. Upper echelons theory
Upper echelons theory suggests that executives will
make decisions that are consistent with their
cognitive base, including values, cognitive models
and personality factors (Hambrick and Mason,
1984) and executive orientation (Finkelstein and
Hambrick, 1996). A fundamental principle of upper
echelons theory is that observable experiences
(i.e. demographic measures such as tenure, age,
functional and educational background) are sys-
tematically related to the underlying cognitive
orientations and knowledge base. In these theor-
etical frameworks, the organisation becomes a
reﬂection of its top executives, whereby the CEO
functions as the central strategic decision-maker
who is able to control the composition of the
organisation’s top strategy-making group (Zahra
and Pearce, 1989). A large number of studies,
triggered by Hambrick and Mason (1984), provide
evidence that differences in CEO characteristics and
top-management-team (TMT) composition (with
respect to dimensions such as tenure, gender,
functional and ethnic background and age) have
an impact on a range of organisational outcomes
such as turnover, innovation, diversiﬁcation, and
organisational performance (Hambrick and
Fukutomi, 1991; Jensen and Zajac, 2004). This
implies that a deeper knowledge of the managerial
characteristics of the CEO and of the factors that
determine the distribution of power among corpor-
ate managers is required to advance knowledge of
the incentives which drive ﬁnancial misrepresenta-
tion and how it is achieved.
3.2.2. Power circulation theory and strategic choice
theory
According to power circulation theory (Occasio,
1994; Occasio, 1999), an inside succession follow-
ing a CEO dismissal reﬂects a successful internal
power contest against the CEO, and the successor is
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 9 of 38
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a contending executive who has won the support
and approval of the board of directors. Because
power contestation and CEO dismissal often occur
in periods of poor ﬁrm performance (Occasio, 1994;
Puffer and Weintrop, 1991) contender successors
will often be charged with initiating strategic
change and improving ﬁrm performance. Insights
from strategic choice theory reveal that CEOs often
choose to initiate a strategic change which closely
matches their prior pattern of strategic choice and
which is consistent with their previous background.
4. The research data
To enhance the understanding of the case analysis,
we now outline the main features of the company,
its competitive environment and the major events
that occurred during the ten-year period 1991–
2001. Subsequently we explain how we collected
the case information.
4.1. The Swissair/SAirgroup
The Swissair/SAirgroup was better known for its
ﬂagship subsidiary Swissair, which was active in
the air transport of passengers and cargo. Its roots
date back to 1919 with the establishment of the
Aero-Gesellschaft Compte, Mittelholzer & Co. In
1931 this company merged with Balair and the
‘Schweizerische Luftverkehrs AG – Swissair’ was
created. From then onwards Swissair grew and
developed airline-related activities. Swissair
became the Swissair Group and transformed into
the SAirgroup on 1 January 2007. Swissair/
SAirgroup published positive income ﬁgures year
after year until the year 2000 (except for 1995 and
1996) (see Graph 1). The balance sheet numbers of
the Swissair Group showed a very stable ﬁnancial
structure which was the basis for the company
nickname ‘the ﬂying bank’. The Swissair/
SAirgroup was a listed company, quoted on the
Zurich stock exchange, with dispersed ownership.
From its establishment until 1991 the Swissair
group only published individual company accounts,
in compliance with Swiss GAAP. From 1991
onwards the Swissair Group published consolidated
accounts and therefore this year is chosen for the
start of the longitudinal analysis.
4.1.1. The competitive environment
Until the early 1990s European airline proﬁts were
secure due to a high degree of regulation and price
agreements. However, from 1993 onwards
European skies became open for ‘community
carriers’2 with EU airlines being free to operate
across any national boundaries within the EU.
Switzerland was not a member of the EU and was
excluded from this arrangement. In response to this
change in the competitive and regulatory environ-
ment, Swissair ﬁrst tried to form an alliance (under
the name Alcazar) with KLM, Austrian Airlines and
SAS. This project was unsuccessful and negoti-
ations were terminated in November 1993. As a
result, Swissair had to look for other means to face
the stronger competition caused by the deregulation
in the EU and to circumvent their ‘aero political
isolation’.3 On 4 May 1995 Swissair acquired a
large minority shareholding of 49.5% in the capital
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 11 of 38
Graph 1
Net income Swissair/Sairgroup 1984–2000 in CHF million
2 An airline qualiﬁes as a ‘community carrier’ under the EU
regulation (EC ordinance 2407/92 of 23 July 1993) when the
majority of the capital is in the hands (in a direct way or an
indirect way) of persons or companies belonging to the EU.
3Message to the shareholders, annual report Swissair 1995.
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of Sabena, the Belgian state-owned national ﬂag
carrier.
4.1.2. The different strategies of the Swissair/
SAirgroup in the 1990s
At the time of the acquisition in mid-1995 the aim of
the investment in Sabena was stated to be to develop
a single airline group concentrated around the two
equal hubs of Zurich and Brussels. The airlines
were considered to be the core business of the
Swissair group although other airline-support activ-
ities were also performed. From 1996 onwards the
group started to invest in the airline-support indus-
try through majority acquisitions of companies
active in the airline-support industries such as
handling, catering, hotel trade, information tech-
nology, aircraft maintenance, aircraft leasing and
real estate administration. This growth strategy was
called the ‘dual’ strategy. SAirgroup management
described the airline business as the ﬁrst pillar and
the airline support businesses as the second pillar of
the group. To underscore the change in strategy the
Swissair Group was renamed into the SAirgroup.
Expansion in the airline business was pursued
through the Hunter Strategy, whereby equity stakes
in airlines were acquired in France, Germany, Italy,
Poland and South Africa during 1998–2000. The
revenue of the Swiss group started to increase from
the launch of the dual strategy and it accelerated
when the Hunter Strategy was implemented (see
Graph 2).
The launch of the dual strategy was accompanied
by a major change in the organisational design of
the group. After the creation of a new holding
structure and the organisational re-design, the legal
entity of the airline Swissair remained responsible
only for passenger transport and had to buy all
support services from companies which now
belonged to the 2nd pillar of the SAirgroup. The
legal entity Swissair was only left with off-balance-
sheet (but valuable) assets such as trafﬁc rights,
slots at airports and a dominant position at its hub
airport, Zurich. Even ownership of the aircraft was
transferred to a new legal entity, Flightlease, which
also provided leasing services for other airlines
from 1998 onwards.
Despite increasing revenue and earnings in the
second half of the 1990s (see Graphs 1 and 2), the
SAirgroup announced a large loss for 2000.
‘In the annals of our company’s history the 2000
business year will be remembered as a poor one.
The SAirgroup did not meet the targets estab-
lished for the airline sector. The substantial losses
stemming from our airline equity holdings were
responsible for a very inadequate result. The
SAirLogistics, SAirServices and SAirRelations
divisions, forming the second pillar of our dual
strategy, have either met or surpassed their
performance targets.’ (Letter of the Chairman –
Annual Report SAirgroup 2000 – page 4)
The problems intensiﬁed during the year 2001. In
July 2001 the SAirgroup divested the two French
airlines it had acquired, and in August 2001
renegotiated its relationship with Sabena. On
2 October 2001 the SAirgroup ﬁled for bankruptcy.
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 12 of 38
Graph 2
Operating revenue Swissair/SAirgroup 1984–2000 in CHF million
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The fall of 2001 was characterised by a general
downturn of trafﬁc, following the events of 9/11,
which resulted in pressures on company liquidity of
the airlines. Consequently the SAirgroup did not
fulﬁll agreements it had concluded with Sabena for
a capital injection intended to take place in October
2001. Sabena was declared bankrupt on
7 November 2001. The speed at which the ﬁnal
death spiral of the Swissair Group occurred was
incomprehensible to many people as, until its 2000
accounts were released in 2001, it had a record of
steady improvement.
4.2. The data collection process
In the ﬁrst phase of the case study we collected
information over a ten-year period on incentives for
ﬁnancial misrepresentation embedded in the con-
tracts governing the ﬁrm, opportunities for discre-
tion, and accounting and real choices. Since the
collection of information on all accounting and real
choices with regard to all events and transactions
would involve an immense amount of data, we use a
disaggregated approach. According to Francis
(2001) the disaggregated approach features a
focus on individual accounting items known to
require substantial managerial judgment and to
have a signiﬁcant impact on accounting numbers.
This disaggregated approach has the potential
advantage of yielding precise, directional predic-
tions based on the researchers’ understanding and
analysis of how decision-makers trade off the
incentives associated with the accounting object
of the study (Francis, 2001). This disaggregated
approach implies that we will combine multiple
incentives with multiple choices in relation to one
individual item with a substantial impact on the
ﬁnancial statements of the SAirgroup. Because in
spring 2001 the new management team of the
SAirgroup blamed the foreign airlines in which the
SAirgroup invested for the ﬁnancial problems of
the SAirgroup (see citation in Section 4.1.2), we use
the investments in foreign airlines as the accounting
item of the study.
Numerous accounting and real choices are taken
by SAir management with regard to the investments
in foreign airlines. For the purpose of this case study
we need to single out those accounting and real
choices that are pursued in order to affect the output
of the accounting system. According to Fields et al.
(2001) the key element to classify an accounting
choice or a real choice as a method used for
accounting numbers’management, is its managerial
intent to affect the accounting numbers. The
managerial intent in our study was derived from
internal archival company data and we provide
evidence of this managerial intent using extracts
from company documents.
In the second phase of the case study we collected
information on the CEO turnover process, CEO
characteristics, top team characteristics, the stra-
tegic choice of the CEO, the internal power relations
between top team members, the division of task
responsibility and the performance indicators
against which individual top managers are evalu-
ated.
5. Analysis of the case data
5.1. Phase I: analysis of ﬁnancial misrepresentation
through an accounting perspective
In the ﬁrst phase of the case study we discuss the
ﬁndings with regard to the incentives, the choices
and the available discretion involved in ﬁnancial
misrepresentation. Although the report prepared
at the request of the administrator of the Swiss
bankrupt airline, revealed that the ﬁnancial state-
ments of 1999 and 20004 did not present the
underlying economic position in a fair way, we
try to unravel whether the roots for this ﬁnancial
misrepresentation lie earlier than 1999. At the
end of phase I we relate these ﬁndings to the
extant accounting literature, in order to ﬁnd out
whether this literature is able to provide a
comprehensive explanation for the observed phe-
nomena.
5.1.1. The existence of contractual incentives
towards ﬁnancial misrepresentation
Reviewing the external contracts we discover
strong incentives embedded in three different
types of contracts. These are the contracts with the
shareholders, with the debt holders and with
regulatory authorities.
5.1.1.1. Contracts with shareholders
The Swissair/SAirgroup was a listed company. In
the ﬁrst half of the 1990s the communication with
the shareholders concentrated mainly on oper-
ational information about the airline activities. In
the second half of the 1990s the external contract
with the shareholders became more important, since
the growth policy of the SAirgroup was partly
ﬁnanced through share issues5 and shares of the
SAirgroup were used as consideration in the
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 13 of 38
4 The administrator of the bankrupt Swiss Group had asked in
the investigation report to analyse the ﬁnancial years 1999 and
2000.
5 In 1999 shares were issued for a value of CHF 325m
through the exercise of conversion rights and staff bonus
distribution (Annual Report 1999).
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acquisition deals.6 From 1997 onwards the account-
ing numbers presented an image of value creation
with increasing revenue, increasing earnings and
increasing cash ﬂows after the launch of the dual
strategy (see Graphs 1 and 3). This higher level of
earnings was evident over the years 1997, 1998 and
1999 (see Graphs 1, 2 and 3).
In this period the communication in the annual
report underlined these characteristics of the
accounting numbers (for illustrative extracts see
Table 1).
5.1.1.2. Contracts with debt holders
To ﬁnance the growth strategy of the SAirgroup,
debt ﬁnancing7 was also used. In 1997 the top
management of the SAirgroup learned (minutes of
the Finance Committee, 18 August 1997) from a
report prepared by a Swiss university professor that,
in order to receive a favourable credit rating on the
debt market in the coming years, the SAirgroup
needed to obtain an equity/total debt ratio (‘eigen-
kapitalquote’) between 25% and 35%. The ﬁnance
committee was told that the current equity/total debt
ratio (17.8%) was too low in comparison with
competitors to obtain a favourable credit rating. The
lower target ratio of 25% was almost attained in
1999 (see Table 2), and the concern to adhere to this
target ﬁnancial structure is found in several internal
documents of the SAirgroup as well as in the
external communication of the SAirgroup (see
Table 2).
5.1.1.3. Contracts with regulators
Over the period of our study, the EU Regulation on
air transport did not change. This meant that only
EU-community carriers were allowed to operate
freely across national boundaries within the EU.
Sabena would loose its community carrier status if
the EU were to conclude that the SAirgroup had
control over Sabena. The Swiss Aviation
Regulation did change during the period of study.
At the end of 1998 a revision of the Swiss Federal
Aviation Act abolished the need for board repre-
sentation by the public institutions and paved the
way for a reduction in size of the Board of
Directors.8 After this change in Swiss Regulation
the Board of the SAirgroup was reduced from
20 members to 10 members.
5.1.1.4. The internal contracts of the ﬁrm
The threat of a performance-related CEO-turnover
is always present during the period of our study. The
explicit internal contracts with regard to remuner-
ation changed twice over the period of the study.
The contracts were changed in 1996 (to take effect
from 1997 onwards) and in 2001. From 1997 until
2000, rewards were linked to the SAirgroup earn-
ings and to the EBIT-ﬁgure of the strategic business
unit within the SAirgroup to which each manager
belonged. From 1997 onwards SAir top executives
received stock options with very short exercise
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 14 of 38
Graph 3
Swissair/SAirgroup operating result and net result in CHF million
Source: Financial Statements Swissair Group/SAirgroup.
6 For example, for the planned increase in the shareholding of
Sabena from 62.5% up to 85% (note 11 Financial Accounts
SAirgroup 2000).
7 In 1999 the SAirgroup issued new bonds for a total amount
of 1400m CHF (note 24 of the ﬁnancial statements 1999) and
920 m CHF bonds were placed in 2000 (note 17 of the ﬁnancial
statements 2000).
8 Pursuant to Art. 762 Swiss Code of Obligations, the
Company confers upon public authorities the right to nominate
10 representatives on the Board of Directors.
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periods (three years). From 1999 onwards Sabena
top management joined the SAirgroup top manage-
ment reward system and received stock options in
SAir shares as well as bonuses partly determined on
the basis of SAirgroup earnings.
The analysis of these contracts reveals the
presence of multiple incentives to inﬂuence a
variety of accounting numbers in a number of
ways, such as reporting steadily increasing earn-
ings, achieving a target equity structure and the
preservation of the impression that the Swissair/
SAirgroup did not control Sabena. The accounting
numbers published by the SAirgroup, especially in
1997, 1998 and 1999, appeared to respond to these
multiple incentives, 1996 and 2000 seemed to be
different. In the next section we will argue which
accounting and real choices with regard to the
airline investments contributed to the management
of these communicated accounting numbers.
5.1.2. Choices employed to inﬂuence the
accounting numbers of the SAirgroup
Following the directionality assumed in the extant
accounting literature (see Figure 1), we now
compile from our archival data, the accounting
and real choices in relation to the investment in
Sabena. We will present the choices with regard to
the Sabena investment in a matrix format classiﬁed
by chronological order and by the type of choice
using the classiﬁcation of Francis (2001).
Subsequently we will execute a cross-case analysis
of the choices taken in relation to all the EU-Hunter
airlines.
5.1.2.1. The choices with regard to the investment
in Sabena
Table 3 presents the accounting choices with regard
to the Sabena investment. Two types of accounting
choices (namely an accounting method choice and
accruals choices) with a major impact on the
ﬁnancial statements will be discussed in depth as
they will allow us to observe the directionality
between some of the variables involved in ﬁnancial
misrepresentation.
a. The accounting method choice
The essence of the investment in Sabena in mid-
1995 was to foresee through several contracts a
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Table 1
CEO messages on the accounting numbers of the SAirgroup in subsequent annual reports
‘1997 was a truly positive year for the SAirgroup, aided by various strategic and operational measures and
having the beneﬁt of a favorable economic environment, the Group was able to move clearly back into
positive territory . . . Consolidated group results exceeded all expectations’ (Annual Report 1997, page 8).
‘Overall Group operating revenue was higher than both the previous year and budgeted expectations. The
operating results and net proﬁt were both improvements on prior-year levels’ (Annual Report 1998, page 9).
‘This two pillars or dual strategy is based on our desire for long-term success. The airline business with its
cyclical nature and ﬂuctuating revenue streams, has been linked with the airline-related activities to form an
aviation group that provides investors with a safer and steadier earnings ﬂow – Our goal in all these
endeavors is to achieve consistently solid results that balance out cyclical tendency of the airline sector . . . ’
(Annual Report 1999, page 6–7).
Table 2
Evolution of the equity/total debt ratio over 1996–2000 and quotations on this issue
‘In the medium term the Group aims to strengthen equity funds by retaining a proportion of proﬁts, and
achieve a balance sheet equity ratio of at least 25% while keeping its net debt/equity ratio below 1’(Annual
Report SAirgroup 1998, page 11).
‘Currently Sabena’s balance sheet contains a liability of 98 Billion BEF. This is the main reason why
Swissair cannot consolidate Sabena because the market capitalisation of Swissair is at the level of 1.2 billion
Swiss Francs’. (Extract from a letter of the CEO of Sabena to the President of the Commercial Court in
Brussels, 28 June 2001).
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Equity/total debt 17.8 % 19.3% 20.3% 24.1% 5.7%
Source: Financial Statements of the SAirgroup 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000.
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framework which made it possible for Swissair to
take control over Sabena, while it apparently
remained an EU airline. The consulting report
‘Flair’, prepared by a well-known consulting ﬁrm at
the request of Swissair in relation to this acquisition,
pointed out this critical element in making the
acquisition successful. On 4 May 1995 Swissair
acquired not only a large minority shareholding of
49.5% in the capital of Sabena, but in addition
granted a loan of 151m Swiss francs (CHF) to the
Belgian government which held the remaining
50.5% of the share capital. This loan entitled
Swissair to raise its equity holding in Sabena from
49.5% to 62.25% when the bilateral agreements
between Switzerland and the EU changed at a future
date, and Sabena would no longer lose its ‘com-
munity carrier’ status by having a Swiss majority
owner. So in 1995 SAirgroup had already prepaid
its expected future capital investment in Sabena.
Further, through the terms of the different
agreements (the Shareholders’ and Management
Agreement (SMA) and the Cooperation Agreement
(CA), Swissair was able both to draft documents to
formally comply with the EU Regulation on
transport and also to obtain a substantial amount
of management power and control in substance over
Sabena. The SMA9 signed between Swissair and
the Belgian State on 4 May 1995, obtained EU
approval on 18 July 1995. Meanwhile, after the
Swiss directors had taken their seats on the Board of
Sabena in May 1995, negotiations on the
Cooperation Agreement between Swissair and
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 16 of 38
Table 3
Accounting choices in relation to the investment in Sabena
A. Inﬂuence on accounting numbers
B. Inﬂuence on presentation
9 The SMA stipulated that the Board of Directors of Sabena
consisted of 12 members from which at least seven had to be
EU citizens. Six out of those 12 directors were chosen by the
Belgian government, ﬁve were appointed by the Swissair/
SAirgroup and one director namely the Chairman of the Board
had to be chosen in consensus by the Belgian government and
the Swissair/SAirgroup. If no consensus could be reached the
Swiss shareholder could appoint a candidate (art. 7 of the SMA).
For the removal of the directors a special majority was needed,
this implied that a Belgian director representing the Belgian
government could not be removed without the approval of the
Swiss shareholder. The addendum of 12 June 1995 to the SMA
stated further that the appointment of a CEO had to be approved
by the majority of the members of the Board of directors. The
CFO and the middle management of Sabena could be proposed
by Swissair (addendum 7 to the SMA). Further, according to the
SMA, the decision to hire and ﬁre top managers in the Sabena
Group was in the hands of the CEO of Sabena, who needed the
approval of the Board to execute these decisions.
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Sabena started among the Board members of
Sabena. On 24 July 1995, a couple of days after
the EU approval of the SMA agreement, the
Cooperation Agreement was ﬁnally negotiated
and signed by the members of the Board of
Sabena. The Cooperation Agreement foresaw the
establishment of a Steering Committee, which
would negotiate and take operating and strategic
decisions for both airlines.
In 1995 the Swissair Group prepared its group
accounts according to Swiss GAAP and the Seventh
Directive. Swissair, based on the legal form of the
SMA, chose to account for Sabena using the equity
method as it formally held only a 49.5% minority
stake. In 1996 the SAirgroup switched to IAS
standards for the preparation of its group accounts.
The IAS standards are principles-based standards
and deﬁne the principle of control in general as ‘the
power to govern the ﬁnancial and operating policies
of an entity so as to obtain beneﬁts from its activities’
(IAS 27, para. 4). Guidance on this principle of
control is included in IAS 27, para. 13 (see Appen-
dix B). Further the conceptual framework of the
International Accounting Standards Committee
states explicitly that transactions should be
accounted for in compliance with their economic
substance rather than with their legal form (IASC,
1989: para. 35). Despite the emphasis on economic
substance in the international accounting standards,
theSAirgroup continued to account for Sabenausing
the equity method in the second half of the 1990s.
Evenwhen in the late 1990s, due to the centralisation
of decision-making of Sabena’s passenger and cargo
transport in SAir hands and the integration of
Sabena’s airline-support activities within the
SAirgroup (see section real choices), the equity
method was no longer appropriate for presenting a
true and fair view of the underlying economic
situation, the SAirgroup continued to use it. The
investigator appointed by the Administrator of the
bankrupt airline, came to the same conclusion.10
Full consolidation of Sabena in the books of
Swissair could have been interpreted by the EU as
evidence that Swissair was controlling Sabena, so it
appears that the equity method continued to be used
to avoid such a risk. The choice of the equity
method instead of full consolidation does not create
any difference with regard to the published earnings
of the Swissair Group and the equity of the Swissair
Group (see also Appendix C: illustration of the
impact of the accounting choices of the Swissair/
SAirgroup on the accounting numbers – Examples
1 and 2). Only the debt structure of the Swissair
Group beneﬁted from this choice, since it enabled
the Swissair Group to keep the liabilities of Sabena
off their own balance sheet (see Appendix C).11
This debt structure however was crucial to obtain a
favourable credit rating from rating agencies (see
Section 5.1.1.2).
b. Accruals choices with regard to the Sabena
investment
Both companies (the Swissair Group and Sabena)
showed a net loss in 1995, the year of the
acquisition. Graphs 3 and 4 (Sabena group) indicate
that both groups realised an operating proﬁt and that
the net losses were mainly the result of accruals
decisions (provision for restructuring –
Swissairgroup, Annual Report 1995, page 10,
note 9 and exceptional provision for ﬂeet renewal
– Sabena Group Annual Report 1995, page 5).
In 1996 two major accrual choices were taken by
SAir management in relation to the airline invest-
ments. The ﬁrst accrual choice was the creation of a
large provision for future airline restructurings. The
second accrual choice consisted of a complete
write-down of the value of the investment in Sabena
in the books of the SAirgroup. From 1997 onwards
a situation ‘technically similar’ to IAS 28 (para. 22)
was created through this prior write-down, which
allowed for an investor’s share of losses of an
associate no longer to be recognised on its annual
accounts if they equal or exceed the carrying
amount of that investment. Although the loss
made by Sabena in 1996 was indeed substantial
(see Graph 4), the recognition of the SAirgroup’s
share in the loss of Sabena would not have reduced
the investment in Sabena in the books of the
SAirgroup to zero in 1996.12 Further this loss in
Sabena for 1996 resulted to a large extent from
accruals choices, namely the creation of provisions
and the recording of large amounts of extraordinary
depreciation. The communication around these
accruals by the Sabena Board of Directors was as
follows:.
‘In order to smooth the return to proﬁtability the
Board of Directors has decided to introduce some
major one-off charges in 1996 to cover restruc-
turing costs in the Horizon ’98 plan and further
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 17 of 38
10 ‘The investigation report’ Ernst & Young Bericht in Sachen
Swissair, January 2003.
11 Full consolidation would have weakened the ‘eigenkapital
ratio’ or equity/debt ratio of the SAirgroup, since the equity/debt
structure of Sabena was much weaker (12.9% in 1997; 12.9% in
1998; 9.9% in 1999 and 0.03% in 2000 – source: annual
accounts of Sabena).
12 49.5% of the loss of Sabena was an amount of 177m CHF.
The carrying value of the investment in Sabena in the books of
the SAirgroup during 1996 was CHF 267m.
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depreciation for the long-distance ﬂeet. – The
Horizon ’98 plan points the way to a return to
proﬁtability in 1998’ (Annual Report Sabena
Group, 1996: 5, message of the Board of
Directors).
The SAirgroup’s accounting choice, to write
down completely the investment in Sabena, was
accompanied with press releases (in Switzerland
and in Belgium) stating that the write-off did not
imply that the SAirgroup would terminate its
co-operation with the Sabena Group, but rather
that further integration was planned. The conse-
quence of the write-down was that losses of Sabena
would no longer inﬂuence SAirgroup earnings. This
managerial intent of shielding the earnings of the
SAirgroup from the losses of Sabena in the future
was revealed in company documents (see Appen-
dix D for the English translation as well as the
original French version of the text).
In 2000 we observe again a major accruals choice
with regard to the investment in Sabena. These
accruals consisted of a provision for future losses
and future commitments with regard to all the
foreign airline investments, despite the fact that the
investment in Sabena was already reduced to zero.
A provision for future losses is both surprising and
unnecessary, since the write-down in 1996 ensured
that future losses of Sabena would no longer
inﬂuence the SAirgroup’s earnings in a negative
way.
c. Real choices with regard to the Sabena
investment: 1996–2000
In 1996 the SAirgroup started to use the possibilities
foreseen in the SMA and CA for taking control in
substance over Sabena, despite having only a
minority stake (49.5%). In February 1996 new
subcommittees of the Board of Directors of Sabena
were created. In the ﬁnance subcommittee SAir
employees held 50% of the votes and in the
remuneration committee SAir employees held the
majority of the votes. From early 1996 onwards the
positions of CEO and CFO of Sabena were
occupied by employees of the SAirgroup who had
their incentive and reward contracts tied to the
earnings of the SAirgroup. Following these
appointments (CEO and CFO), the majority of the
members of the Swissair/Sabena Steering
Committee consisted of SAirgroup employees.
This Steering Committee was in charge of the
operating decisions of both airlines.
The activities of Sabena, like the activities of the
SAirgroup, consisted of airline activities (passenger
and cargo transport) and airline-support activities.
As soon as SAirGroup employees held the majority
in the Steering Committee and the Swiss CEO of
Sabena, together with a number of SAir employees,
occupied executive management positions in the
Sabena group,13 Sabena’s airline-support activities
(e.g. IT-services, catering services, ground handling
services, maintenance of the new-generation
engines, D-Checks on the Sabena Airbus ﬂeet)
were gradually outsourced over the years to the 2nd
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 18 of 38
Graph 4
Overview of the operating result and the net result of the Sabena Group in BEF million
Source: Financial Statements of the Sabena Group.
13 An e-mail request of the Secretary General of the
SAirgroup to the Secretary General of the Sabena group on 10
April 2001 with regard to which SAirGroup employees did
serve on the Board of Sabena or on the Executive Management
of Sabena or on lower but important management functions
revealed the following information. Besides the CEO and CFO,
the project leader for the business development plan 1998–2000
of Sabena and the Vice President Marketing and Product were
also SAirGroup employees.
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pillar or the airline-support strategic business units
of the SAirgroup (see Table 4 and contracts in
Appendix A). The operating decisions with regard
to Sabena’s airline activities (cargo and passenger
transport) were gradually centralised in the hands of
SAir management (see Table 4 and the contracts in
Appendix A).
The ﬁrst outsourcing related to the IT-activities of
Sabena to the SAirgroup:
‘Atraxis’ ﬁrst year as an independent information
technology company of the SAirgroup was very
challenging . . . Several reservations and hand-
ling systems were delivered to third party
customers and made operational, including the
complete migration of the Sabena booking and
handling system.’
(Annual Report SAirgroup 1996, page 18)
If this outsourcing of activities had taken place
using arm’s-length transfer prices, these decisions
could be seen as normal operating decisions.
However, due to the use of not-at-arm’s-length
transfer pricing, beneﬁts were transferred from
Sabena to the airline-support strategic business
units of the SAirgroup. The managerial intent of
transferring beneﬁts through this outsourcing pro-
cess is admitted, in the agreement signed on
2 August 2001 between the SAirgroup, the
Belgian State and Sabena in point (ii) of article
6.3 (see Appendix E).
In addition to the outsourcing mechanism, the
SAirgroup obtained further beneﬁts from the cen-
tralisation of the operating decisions on Sabena’s
cargo and passenger transport in the hands of SAir
top management. As a result of the centralisation,
SAirgroup management obtained control over
Sabena’s revenue from cargo and passenger trans-
port. This mechanism has been referred to in point
(iii) of the agreement of 2001 (see Appendix E).
From 1997 onwards, decisions with regard to
Sabena’s cargo transport were made solely by SAir
management.
‘On December 16th 1996, Swisscargo and
Sabena signed an agreement whereby
Swisscargo’s distribution network would market
the entire freight capacity of Sabena’s ﬂeet of
aircraft as of January 1, 1997. Swisscargo thereby
enlarged its freight capacity by almost one
quarter and is taking full advantage of the chance
to create a cargo hub in Brussels’.
(Annual Report SAirgroup 1997, page 20)
In practice this meant that Swisscargo, being part
of SAirlogistics, earned revenue from transporting
the cargo in the ‘belly-space’ of Sabena aircraft.14
Sabena received a reimbursement which did not
even cover the direct costs of transporting the cargo.
In 1997 the revenue earned from this cargo
assumption represented 13% of the revenue of
SAirlogistics.15
The centralisation of Sabena’s passenger trans-
port business in the hands of SAir management
followed in 1999. We explain this centralisation in
more detail as it will be used later to illustrate the
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 19 of 38
Table 4
Real choices with regard to the the investment in Sabena
14 ‘Results for 1997 also include the assumption by
Swisscargo of Sabena’s cargo business, which increased the
relevant operating revenue item by CHF 160m (Annual
Accounts SAirgroup 1997, page 16, note 1).
15 The total revenue reported by SAirlogistics in 1997 was
CHF 1,221m (Annual Accounts SAirgroup 1997, page 14).
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variables used to create the necessary ﬁnancial
reporting discretion in order to record accounting
numbers in line with the target accounting numbers.
Together with the investments in other airlines, the
Hunter Strategy (developed during the winter
1997–1998) also foresaw a change of the hub
concept. Instead of organising passenger transport
around two hubs (Zurich and Brussels, whereby
inter-continental travel was organised from the two
hubs onwards), the Hunter strategy foresaw only
one central hub for the whole group, namely Zurich.
The purpose of this single, central hub was to
increase inter-continental travel from the Zurich
hub (implying use of the Swissair ﬂeet and
increasing Swissair’s passenger revenue). A con-
sulting report, prepared in October 1997, stated that
passengers could be persuaded to take less obvious
choices through, for example, price advantages or
loyalty schemes and passengers could be re-routed
through the Zurich hub by such mechanisms.16
In order to execute this idea, the important
decisions in relation to passenger transport (i.e
marketing, sales, network planning and revenue
management) of the airlines Swissair and Sabena
were centralised in the newly created Airline
Management Partnership (AMP) from mid-1999
onwards. The top management of AMP consisted of
three SAirgroup employees namely the CEO of the
SAirgroup, the CEO of Swissair and the CEO of
Sabena. The CEO of the SAirgroup had the ultimate
decision-making power in the AMP. The underlying
legal form of the AMP was created mid-2000 and
took the form of a partnership whereby the shares
were held 50% by Swissair and 50% by Sabena.
This legal contract was referred to the EU author-
ities. By pricing decisions (changes in the fare
structure of tickets), promotion decisions (the
awarding of miles) and by network decisions for
both airlines (a rescheduling of the timetables),
AMP top management was able to inﬂuence the
buying behaviour of customers (i.e. many passen-
gers, especially business passengers, now boarded
Swissair inter-continental ﬂights instead of Sabena
inter-continental ﬂights). These mechanisms caused
a passenger revenue shift from Sabena to Swissair,
while the direct operating costs for ﬂying to the
destinations remained with the individual airlines.
The impact of this mechanism on the results of the
airlines can be derived from SAirgroup’s informa-
tion provided on the cost structure of the airlines in
their prospectuses.17 Through centralisation of
passenger transport decisions SAir top management
now controlled 80% of revenue of the Sabena
Group through AMP.18 It is therefore no surprise
that in the prospectus issued by the SAirgroup for
placements of public debt (11 November 1999
US$350,000,000 – 7.5% guaranteed notes due
2004, page 24) SAir management described the
vehicle of AMP (referred to as ‘project Diamond’)
as ‘a virtual merger of Swissair and Sabena’. The
losses to Sabena as a result of these real choices
(outsourcing and centralisation) would not show in
the SAir group earnings because of the write-down
of the investment in 1996.
By considering the time-ordered presentation of
choices (see Tables 3 and 4) with regard to the
investment in Sabena, we distinguish an underlying
pattern. At acquisition, real choices (contract struc-
turing) in combination with accounting choices
were used to ensure that the investment formally
complied with the EU Regulation, while allowing
control in substance to be taken. Next the invest-
ment was written down and the restructuring of
activities started, whereby beneﬁts were transferred
from Sabena to the SAirgroup. However, the
provisions for future losses in 2000, do not seem
to ﬁt into the pattern. It is surprising that a provision
for future losses is recorded, since the write-down of
1996 ensured that future losses of Sabena would no
longer inﬂuence the SAirgoup’s earnings in a
negative way. In order to ﬁnd out whether these
observed patterns are a coherent set of choices, we
compare them with the choices made in relation to
the EU-Hunter airline investments.
5.1.2.2. Choices in relation to the investments in
other EU airlines – the Hunter strategy
The ‘Hunter Strategy,’ also foresaw alliances with
other European national airlines:
‘The intended expansion of Swissair was focused
on countries, airports and markets with large
growth potential (Belgium, Austria, Finland,
Hungary, Portugal and Ireland), and not on the
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 20 of 38
16 This element is also included in the minutes of the
Executive Board of the SAirgroup, 19 January 1998.
17 Prospectus SAirgroup 5 October 2000, €400,000,000 –
6.625% guaranteed bonds due 2010 – page 43: The very nature
of the airline business is such that a carrier’s operations are
highly leveraged. Each ﬂight has ﬁxed costs such as fuel, fees
and labour, while revenue from the ﬂight depends entirely on the
number of passengers or cargo carried and the fares paid. This
means that any decrease in the number of passengers or cargo
carried and/or fares paid results in a disproportionately greater
decrease in proﬁts. On the other hand, any increase of customer
demand which signiﬁcantly exceeds planning may, in connec-
tion with a limited extension of capacity, lead to substantially
higher average proceeds per ﬂight.
18 Total revenue of the Sabena Group in 1999 is €2,370m,
whereby revenue from ﬂight operations in 1999 is €1,929m
(note C to the consolidated proﬁt and loss account of Sabena,
Annual Report 1999, page 18).
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mature markets such as Germany, France and
Italy. In addition, the Zurich airport was to be
used as a central hub and expanded. The Hunter
strategy was conceived as a moderate investment
strategy with clearly minority investments
(10%–30%) and deﬁned capital requirements
(CHF 300 million).’19
The ﬁrst acquisitions following adoption of this
strategy took place in autumn of 1998 and were
followed by further acquisitions in 1999. However,
the type of companies acquired and the terms of
acquisition did not match the originally conceived
strategy (see citation above), as shown in Table 5.
In a similar way to the Sabena investment deal,
the SAirgroup in fact controlled these airlines
through agreements.
‘The starting point led Swissair to formally
comply with the EU ordinance, but de facto to
circumvent this regulation. In order to obtain
direct management control immediately as well
as to formally insure the subsequent takeover of a
majority interest, the Group had to resort to
complex and difﬁcult management structures,
call/put options, portage solutions, guarantee
commitments, as well as multiple tiered and
non-transparent intermediate ﬁnancing’.
(Investigation undertaken at the request of the
Administrator of the SAirgroup regarding
Swissair, press release).
As well as the similar structuring of contracts we
discovered many other similarities (see Table 6).
The data in Table 6 show an almost identical
pattern of accounting and real choices in relation to
all the nearly-majority acquisitions in EU-airlines
except for the presentation choice of the write-
downs of the EU Hunter airlines (see Tables 3
and 5). We interpret this as a repeated application of
a pattern of choices that had been shown to be useful
to date in attaining the desired accounting numbers.
In the next section we examine the discretion that
was available to management to pursue the publi-
cation of the target accounting numbers.
5.1.3. Analysis of the available accounting
discretion
Management can only make choices when they
have the discretion to do so. Following our
framework for analysis (see Figure 1), we look for
variables which inﬂuence the available discretion
through an analysis of the institutional environment
and company characteristics (ownership and board
characteristics). Regarding institutional elements
we note that the Sabena investment and the EU
Hunter investments were made in countries which
are characterised by lower quality accounting
standards (Ball et al., 2000; Ali and Hwang,
2000), a lower degree of investor protection, a
lower risk of litigation and a lower degree of
enforcement (La Porta et al., 2007, 2008; Hope,
2003). So all EU airline investments were made in
countries where the institutional environment
allowed more accounting discretion.
Regarding company characteristics, we observe
that all the EU airline investments were made in
non-listed companies. After the investment deal
with the SAirgroup, the ownership structure of each
of the EU Hunter airlines was changed into a
concentrated ownership structure with two major
shareholders. Sabena already had this ownership
structure at the time the investment was taken.
Agency research shows that the degree of owner-
ship concentration affects the nature of contracting.
Research results are available that demonstrate that
accounting informativeness tends to decline as
ownership concentration increases (Dempsey et
al., 1993; Warﬁeld et al., 1995; Donnelly and
Lynch, 2002; Fan and Wong, 2002) . We conclude
that we not only observe a pattern of identical real
and accounting choices (see Tables 3, 4 and 6) with
regard to Sabena and the EU Hunter airline
investments (except for the presentation choice
with regard to the write-down) but also that the
company characteristics and the institutional envir-
onments of these airlines are similar.
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Table 5
Overview of the investments made under the
Hunter Strategy
Year Country Company % of
shareholdings
1998 Germany LTU 49.90
1998 France Air Litoral 49.00
1998 Italy Air Europe 49.90
1998 Italy Volare 34.00
1999 France AOM 49.50
1999 Poland LOT 37.60
1999 South Africa SAA 20.00
2000 Italy Volare Group
out of Air
Europe and
Volare
49.79
Source: Annual Reports of the SAirgroup
1998–2000.
19 See press release accompanying the report ‘Results of the
investigation regarding Swissair’.
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If we analyse the board characteristics of the
SAirgroup (size, composition) we observe changes
over the time span analysed (1991–2000). At the
end of 1998 a revision of the Swiss Federal Aviation
Act abolished the need for board representation by
the public institutions and paved the way for a
reduction of the Board of Directors. Most of the
Board members saw their directorship come to an
end early in 1999. This implies that when Hunter
investments had to be approved by the Board, many
of the members were at the end of their mandate.
The short-term horizon problem, which is studied in
relation to CEOs, might also be an issue in the
governance process by boards. ‘Short term horizon’
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 22 of 38
Table 6
Choices with regard to the EU Hunter airlines
Accounting choices
Inﬂuence on accounting numbers
Inﬂuence on presentation
Real choices
* ‘The SAir has amalgamated the charter activities of Balair, Sobelair, LTU, Air Europe and Volare into the
European Leisure Group.’
(Annual Report 1999, page 15)
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in relation to boards might not imply an extra
incentive to manage earnings, but could point to the
conclusion that their desire to monitor might be less.
Many Board members of the SAirgroup held
identical multiple directorships. After the Board
reform, the majority of the Board members of the
SAirgroup were also directors of a ﬁnancial insti-
tution which ﬁnanced not only the SAirgroup, but
also other companies in the airline value chain,
namely aircraft manufacturers (the manufacturer of
Airbus) and the Zurich Airport. If the same identical
inter-corporate directorships are present in the
composition of the Board of Directors independ-
ence might suffer, since it is an open question which
company’s interests would have priority in case of
conﬂict.
5.1.4. An accounting perspective on ﬁnancial
misrepresentation
Analysing the multiple incentives, multiple choices
and available discretion through an accounting
literature perspective (see Figure 1) we ﬁnd a
number of items which cannot be adequately
explained by this accounting literature. We observe
unexplained elements with regard to incentives, the
accounting choices and the available discretion.
According to this literature, incentives embedded in
contracts are explanatory variables and exogenous
in relation to the presence of ﬁnancial misrepresen-
tation. The remuneration contract however was
rewritten twice and it seems that the contract was
rewritten in such a way to allow the choices which
were necessary to facilitate the ﬁnancial presenta-
tion of the target accounting numbers. The bonuses
available from 1997 onwards beneﬁted from
accounting choices made in 1996. The new CFO
of the SAirgroup, appointed in July 2001, was
surprised that the favourable impact of the not arm’s
length transfer prices was not eliminated from the
airline-related SBU ﬁgures for evaluation and
bonus determination purposes (see investigation
prepared at the request of the Administrator of the
bankrupt Swissair Group). Further we notice that
the change in Swiss Aviation Regulation (change in
external contract) had an impact on Board charac-
teristics. This impact coincided with the time period
that Board members were asked to approve the
Hunter Strategy.
Concerning the accounting choices, two elements
are difﬁcult to understand. First the question arises
why thewrite-down of Sabena (1996) is presented in
a different manner than the write-down of the EU
Hunter airlines in 1998 and 1999 (see Tables 3 and
6). Second it is difﬁcult to understand, from an
accounting point of view, why a provision for future
losses is created in the 2000 annual accounts for
investments already fully written down (Sabena –
1996; Air Litoral – 1998; other EU airlines in 1999).
Finally, the CEO of the SAirgroup needed
discretion to transfer beneﬁts from one unit of the
group to another unit. This discretion is not
explained by the variables uncovered by traditional
accounting research. Other mechanisms must be
used to allow such transfers to happen. As all
deﬁnitions of ﬁnancial misrepresentation and earn-
ings management point to the central role of top
management in the decision to engage in the
management of accounting numbers, we now
borrow insights from management theories in
order to ﬁnd explanations for the elements listed
in this section.
5.2. Phase 2: A management theory perspective on
ﬁnancial misrepresentation
In this second phase of the case study we introduce
insights from upper-echelons theory, strategic
choice theory and power circulation theory. We
collect data on CEO characteristics, CEO succes-
sion, the composition of top management teams, the
strategic choice of the CEO and the distribution of
responsibilities among top teams. These elements
are presented in Table 7 below.
Consistent with power circulation theory, in 1996
the new CEO started a strategic change which
closely matched his prior pattern of strategic choice,
which is consistent with his previous background
and which brought him to the top of the SAirgroup.
In the early 1990s this CEO had successfully
implemented a growth strategy in the legally
independent division of the Swissair Group,
Swissair Associated Companies (SAC) which was
active in the catering and the hotel business. That
growth strategy was characterised by acquisitions
and by outsourcing the catering activities of
Swissair to the SAC from 1993 onwards. These
strategies are consistent with his ﬁnancial back-
ground as, before running the SAC, he had worked
for a Swiss bank in the 1980s. Research in the
management literature suggests that people with a
ﬁnancial background typically regard ﬁrms as a
collection of assets that need not be associated with
a single line of business (Jensen and Zajac, 2004).
The CEO diversiﬁed the corporate strategy of the
Swissair/SAirgroup by launching his ‘dual’ strategy.
This event can be interpreted as supporting a variant
of the ability-matching model which suggests that a
CEOmay attempt to increase his value to the ﬁrm by
changing the business mix of the ﬁrm to one for
which his managerial skills are uniquely well suited
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). The dual strategy was a
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 15/2/2010 03 ABR Jorissen.3d Page 23 of 38
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copy of his prior strategy when he was leading the
SAC. However, this time a combination of account-
ing and real choices was needed to present his
strategy as a successful one. This CEO had planned
an initial public offering (IPO) on a number of
airline-support strategic business units (SBUs) for
2001. The ﬁnancial resources generated by these
future IPOswere needed to ﬁnance the dual strategy.
These IPO decisions however entailed incentives
towards ﬁnancial misrepresentation at segmental
reporting level. The accounting choices in combin-
ation with the not arm’s length transfer pricing for
the activities outsourced to the 2nd pillar of the
SAirgroup, made these airline-support SBUs also
look more proﬁtable.
When the CEO of the SAirgroup wanted to
pursue the policy of re-routing the passengers
through the Zurich hub, he centralised all oper-
ational decisions with regard to the airlines Sabena
and Swissair (see 5.1.2.1.b) into his own hands.
This centralisation changed drastically the task
responsibilities of the CEOs of the individual
airlines. When the American CEO of Swissair
resigned in mid-2000, his complaint was that he
never received the authority and responsibility to
run the airline as he wished:
‘Find the best person in the world to replace me.
But give him the necessary authority so that he
can run the airline as he wants. Do not under-
estimate the importance of this point. The fact
that I was not able to stay in the companywas due
to the fact that this leadership question was not
taken care of.’
(Translated from Luchinger, page 260, extract
from the resignation letter of J. Katz).
The CEO of the SAirgroup appointed in 2001
again changed the strategy of the group. The focus
came back to the airline industry. However, the new
CEO and his team now opted to divest from the EU
airlines which they blamed for the ﬁnancial turmoil
the SAir Group was facing (see citation in Section
4.2). Both CEOs not only changed the strategy of
the SAir Group shortly after they took the leading
position in the company, they also both changed the
organisational structure of the company and the
composition of the top management group. In
particular, they removed internal management with
long tenure from important functions and replaced
them with external managers. To avoid resistance to
those choices which were necessary to attain the
target accounting numbers, centralisation decisions
were taken together with changes to the reward
structure.
If we combine the pattern detected in the ﬁrst
phase of the case analysis with the results of the
second phase of the case analysis, we are able to
shed light on the unexplained items left after the ﬁrst
phase (see Section 5.1.4).
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6. A multi-theory perspective on ﬁnancial
misrepresentation
The combination of case ﬁndings from the ﬁrst
phase of the case analysis with the case data from
the second phase results in a multi-theory perspec-
tive on the process of ﬁnancial misrepresentation.
This multi-theory perspective provides additional
insights on the incentives which trigger ﬁnancial
misrepresentation, the choices employed to arrive at
the target accounting numbers and the variables
managed to obtain the necessary discretion to do so.
6.1. The role of incentives embedded in contracts
governing the ﬁrm in the process of ﬁnancial
misrepresentation
Incentives are traditionally regarded in theory-
based quantitative research as exogenous variables
to the process of ﬁnancial misrepresentation. In the
literature, there is a theoretically proposed relation-
ship between the incentives embedded in the
contracts and the presence and the magnitude of
ﬁnancialmisrepresentation (see Figure 1). However,
in the ﬁrst phase of the case study we observed that
the remuneration contracts were rewritten twice
over the period of study. It appears that the contracts
were rewritten in such a way to allow the necessary
accounting and real choices to be implemented in
order to attain the target accounting numbers. The
necessary choices seem to be explanatory variables
and the incentives embedded in the contracts the
explained variables. Combining these observations
with the results of the second phase of the case
analysis, we ﬁnd that these contracts are rewritten
each time a new CEO enters the company and
embarks on a new strategy. Accounting numbers
have to represent the successful implementation of
the CEO’s strategy from the second year that the
CEO is in ofﬁce. The contracts and the choices
interact in order to arrive at the target accounting
numbers, which are aligned with the strategic
choice of the CEO. Consequently there is simul-
taneity between the remuneration contracts and the
choices needed to attain the target accounting
numbers.
We can extend the observation on the remuner-
ation contracts to other contracts of the ﬁrm.
Internal explicit contracts (such as remuneration
contracts) are easier to renegotiate than external
contracts. Whether or not an external contract can
be renegotiated depends on the power relationship
between the ﬁrm and the external party. With regard
to debt covenants it is possible that for small ﬁrms,
the covenants are imposed to them. Larger ﬁrms
may be able to negotiate the contracts with debt
holders. Concerning regulation, large companies
can be more inﬂuential than small companies with
regard to shaping regulation or codes issued by
regulatory authorities. As such, regulation might be
endogenous for large ﬁrms in the industry, whereas
the same regulation could have an exogenous
character for the smaller ﬁrms in the same industry.
The external contracts with shareholders cannot
usually be renegotiated.
These results of the multi-theory perspective on
the case data provide evidence that the direction of
the causation assumed in the agency framework is
often reversed. The incentive embedded in a
negotiable contract of the ﬁrm becomes dependent
on the target accounting numbers to be reported and
the accompanying accounting and real choices to be
made in order to arrive at the target accounting
numbers. The case results allow us to conclude that
incentives in negotiated contracts are endogenous in
the process of ﬁnancial misrepresentation.
6.2. Multiple choices employed in ﬁnancial
misrepresentation
The multi-theory perspective provides explanations
with regard to a number of accounting choices
discovered in the ﬁrst phase of the case analysis and
which could not be adequately explained by the
accounting literature perspective. The analysis of
the managerial background and career path of the
CEO provided us with a deeper understanding of
the origin of the CEO’s strategic choices and the
interplay with accounting and real choices that were
necessary to present his strategy as successful. If we
relate the accounting and real choices to the
respective CEO tenures, the difference in the
presentation and classiﬁcation of the write-downs
of the airline investments can now be explained (see
Tables 3, 4 and 6 in combination with Table 7). The
write-downs in 1998 and 1999 related to the CEO’s
own investment decisions, whereas the investment
in Sabena was the responsibility of the predecessor
CEO. An explicit presentation of this write-down of
Sabena could not harm the position of the current
CEO. This write-down of 1996, which could be
blamed on the predecessor CEO, was income
enhancing for the future, especially in combination
with the real choices to come. One could wonder
whether the CEO of the SAirgroup had this in mind
when writing in the Annual Report of 1996:
‘The measures that we have introduced form the
basis for a stronger and healthier SAirgroup. We
believe that we have the foundation in place that
will enable us to achieve substantially better
results in the coming years, providing an appro-
priate return on invested capital and allowing our
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staff to take advantage of the proﬁt-related bonus
scheme that we have created.’
(Annual Report 1996, page 6)
The provision for future losses and future
commitments recorded in the annual accounts of
2000 could also be blamed on a predecessor CEO
and therefore a visible presentation was no problem.
This accruals decision of the CEO coming on board
of the SAirgroup in 2001 before the authorisation
for issue of the annual accounts of 2000, would also
enhance the future income of the SAirgroup through
its reversal effect later.
‘The realignment of our Group’s overall business
thrust requires corrective action in balance-sheet
terms, with the charging of extensive depreci-
ation and provisions to the 2000 results. This will
enable the Swissair Group to focus on its new
corporate objectives free of the ﬁnancial burdens
of the past.’
(Annual Report 2000, page 5)
We observe that choices are inﬂuenced by the
incentive to communicate the CEO’s strategic
choice as successful, while hiding away the current
CEO’s negative actions and emphasising the nega-
tive actions of predecessor CEOs.
6.3. Discretion to manage accounting numbers
The multi-theory perspective also allows us to
uncover additional mechanisms which provide
discretion to the CEO and the top management
team to engage in ﬁnancial misrepresentation. The
analysis of the case data in the ﬁrst phase could not
explain how it was possible to structure transactions
and applying a transfer pricing policy, not deter-
mined on an arm’s length basis, which had an
impact on the results of the individual SBUs.
According to the accounting literature, opportun-
ities for discretion arise from external environmen-
tal sources (such as the quality of GAAP and the
institutional characteristics) and company charac-
teristics (such as governance and ownership).
However, in order to transfer beneﬁts between the
different entities of a group, other mechanisms than
those discovered by the extant literature were
needed.
The insights derived from the second phase of the
case analysis indicate that the CEO used ﬁrst of all
his power to change the top team composition. A
change in the executive team enlarges the informa-
tion asymmetry between the CEO and his new top
team members (because of external recruitment).
However, merely changing the top team compos-
ition was not sufﬁcient to obtain discretion. The
need for accounting discretion over a business unit
also shaped the degree of centralisation, the division
of task responsibilities between top team executives
and the choice of the performance indicator in the
bonus plan of the executive of the business unit (see
creation of AMP). The incentive schemes for the
individual top team members were constructed in
such a way that the CEOs of the SBUs would not
oppose the earnings management policy of the
corporate CEO. In case of a detrimental impact of a
choice necessary to pursue the overall strategy
(reporting strategy inclusive) on their business unit
results, the CEOs of the SBUs were shielded to a
certain degree (which could vary) from this nega-
tive impact (e.g. a part of the bonus plan of the top
executives of Sabena was tied to the net result of the
SAirgroup and the top executives of Sabena took
also part in the share option plan of the SAirgroup,
in common with the SAir executives). When the
accounting choices were beneﬁcial for the units, the
top team members beneﬁted from both the real
decisions and from the ‘pure’ accounting decisions
through their bonus plan. This adaptation of the
bonus and incentive plan in line with the ﬁnancial
reporting strategy, implies a renegotiation of
internal contracts with the SBU managers. This
multi-theory lens provides evidence that within-
ﬁrm relations (namely the organisational design, the
centralisation/decentralisation decisions, top team
composition, task responsibility and performance
indicators for evaluation and reward purposes) need
to be managed as well in order to obtain managerial
discretion to pursue ﬁnancial misrepresentation.
Traditional earnings management research usu-
ally regards the available discretion as an exogen-
ous opportunity to engage in ﬁnancial
misrepresentation. The case data however reveal
that a number of opportunities for discretion are
created simultaneously with the renegotiation of
contracts and the decision on the accounting and
real choices needed to attain the target accounting
numbers. The variables used to create within-ﬁrm
discretion have an endogenous character and are
determined in line with the strategic choice of the
CEO. The opportunities for discretion created by
ownership characteristics (concentrated vs non-
concentrated and listed vs non-listed) and govern-
ance characteristics can have an endogenous char-
acter when the CEO is able to inﬂuence these
characteristics (e.g. change of the ownership struc-
ture of a number of EU airlines after the investment
of the SAirgroup – see Section 5.1.3). Discretion
stemming from the external environment such as
the institutional variables (investor protection, risk
of litigation) and the quality of GAAP are
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exogenous to ﬁnancial misrepresentation. However,
with regard to the quality of GAAP it is possible to
distinguish circumstances where the GAAP used is
an endogenous variable. One such circumstance is
when GAAP can be applied on a voluntary basis
instead of a mandatory basis. Another circumstance
is when companies are able to inﬂuence the
standard-setter through lobbying when standards
which affect their ﬁnancial situation are on the
agenda. The GAAP applied will then have an
endogenous character in the process of ﬁnancial
misrepresentation. The second circumstance applies
to large companies. So we notice that whether or not
a variable is endogenous in the process of ﬁnancial
misrepresentation is also inﬂuenced by the size of
the company.
These additional insights on the role of incen-
tives, choices and discretion in ﬁnancial misrepre-
sentation allow us to adapt Figure 1 (ﬁnancial
misrepresentation through an accounting perspec-
tive) in line with the case results obtained through
the multi-theory perspective. The ﬁndings obtained
through this multi-theory perspective are presented
graphically and concisely in Figure 2.
Within the boundaries of the strategic choice of
the CEO a number of variables, traditionally
regarded as exogenous to the presence or absence
of ﬁnancial misrepresentation, might have an
endogenous character. This ﬁnding applies to
incentives embedded in negotiable contracts and a
number of opportunities for discretion. According
to the case data only incentives embedded in non-
negotiable contracts and discretion inﬂuenced by
the institutional environment have an exogenous
character in the process of earnings management.
6.4. Consequences of this ﬁnancial
misrepresentation
A renegotiation of contracts together with the
creation and use of existing opportunities for
discretion, made it possible for the CEO to embark
on a process which led to a misrepresentation of the
economic situation of the SAirgroup. We notice that
in this process extensive use was made of
unobservable choices. Choices whereby the user
of the accounts can adjust for their inﬂuence do not
necessarily mislead the reader of the ﬁnancial
statements (e.g. an accruals decision disclosed in a
transparent way, a gain on sale of assets which is
properly disclosed, off-balance-sheet leasing when
lease payments are disclosed in the notes). When
companies do not fully consolidate their invest-
ments no information is provided in the notes which
would allow users of those accounts to adjust for
these decisions and to evaluate their impact on
published ﬁgures (see also AAA, 2003). This case
study indicates how legal contract structuring was
used to mask the control in substance of a subsidiary
for group accounts purposes. The incorrect answer
to the question of control led to a mis-stated
ﬁnancial position being reported on the consoli-
dated balance sheet (see Appendix C). The foun-
dations for the disconnection between the published
accounting numbers on ﬁrm performance and the
underlying economic performance of the entity
were laid in the early years of the investment in
Sabena. The disconnection between the published
accounting numbers and the underlying economic
performance was marginal at the start, but the gap
enlarged between 1997 and 1998, and widened
drastically in 1999 once the Hunter strategy had
been fully implemented. If SAir top management
had consolidated the foreign airlines many external
parties would have taken different decisions on the
basis of annual accounts in which these investments
would have been fully consolidated. Now share-
holders, debt holders and other stakeholders of the
SAirgroup have taken suboptimal economic deci-
sions with regard to their relationship with the
SAirgroup in 1999 and 2000 because published
accounting numbers did not represent the under-
lying economic reality. The actual debt structure
was much riskier than the published debt structure
and the published earnings ﬁgures were managed
upwards.
7. Conclusion
In contrast to existing research we studied the
management of accounting numbers from an inte-
grated (multiple incentives and multiple methods)
and dynamic perspective using a multi-theory
perspective. With this research design we
responded to several calls in the literature (see
Schipper, 1989; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Fields,
Lys and Vincent, 2001). Through access to internal
company data we were able to observe the incen-
tives which triggered the decision to engage in
ﬁnancial misrepresentation together with the under-
lying choices and mechanisms which support or
facilitate this decision from an internal company
perspective. This case study approach allows us to
provide insights in the process of ﬁnancial misrep-
resentation additional to the extant accounting
literature. In the ﬁrst phase of the case analysis we
looked through an accounting perspective to the
process of ﬁnancial misrepresentation. In the sec-
ond phase of the case analysis we added insights
from management theory in order to provide a
richer explanation for the data observed. The
combination of the case results of these two phases
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allow us ﬁrst to understand the nature of the
relationships between the variables involved in the
process of ﬁnancial misrepresentation and second to
gain insight in variables, previously uncovered by
traditional earnings management literature, which
are used to obtain discretion. The insights of both
theoretical perspectives are complimentary for
understanding the process of ﬁnancial misrepresen-
tation.
Traditional earnings management research
regards all contracts and available discretion as
exogenous variables in the process of ﬁnancial
misrepresentation in order to explain the presence
or absence of earnings management and its magni-
tude. The multi-theory perspective however shows
that accounting numbers are used and abused to
achieve managerial objectives and to act according
to the incentives embedded in non-negotiable
contracts within the constraints of the environmen-
tally determined discretion. According to the case
results, only the incentives embedded in the non-
negotiable contracts and the environmentally deter-
mined discretion, such as institutional variables and
the quality of GAAP are exogenous in the process
of ﬁnancial misrepresentation. We ﬁnd that incen-
tives embedded in negotiable contracts, governance
characteristics and ownership characteristics, which
have traditionally been regarded as exogenous in
the process of ﬁnancial misrepresentation, have an
endogenous character. The case results show that
these variables, which are supposed to affect
ﬁnancial misrepresentation, depend themselves on
that outcome. Incentives in negotiated contracts and
certain sources of discretion are determined simul-
taneously with the type and the magnitude of
ﬁnancial misrepresentation and the methods to
arrive at that ﬁnancial misrepresentation.
Simultaneity is, alongside omitted variables, an
important cause of endogeneity (Chenhall and
Moers, 2007). This ﬁnding points to speciﬁcation
problems in large-scale empirical research as the
causality assumed there is often reversed in practice
and independent and dependent variables are
incorrectly distinguished. An additional contribu-
tion of the multi-theory perspective is that it
identiﬁes the boundaries within which these vari-
ables interact. The case data reveal that these
variables are simultaneously determined within the
frame of the strategic choice of the CEO and the
accompanying reporting strategy to present the
strategic choice as successful.
Furthermore, this multi-theory perspective
allows us to discover additional elements of
discretion on top of the variables used in the extant
literature. The data indicate that in order to imple-
ment the ‘necessary’ accounting and real choices to
obtain the ‘target’ accounting numbers, the follow-
ing variables can also be adapted: the composition
of the dominant coalition, the organisational design,
and the design of the management control system
(degree of centralisation, the division of task
responsibilities and the incentive and reward struc-
tures).
At a higher level the case ﬁndings allow us to
conclude that ﬁnancial misrepresentation or the
management of the accounting numbers can involve
decisions in all management areas (ﬁnancial state-
ments, narratives in the annual report, composition
of the top team, decisions on organisational struc-
ture, division of responsibilities, the management
control system, investment decisions and operating
decisions). Eliminating the management of
accounting numbers in these situations would
require a complete re-orientation of the strategy,
restructuring of activities, redesign of the organisa-
tion and changing the management control systems
back to those required to meet real business needs in
terms of the available market opportunities.
With this multi-theory analysis we have shown
that current accounting research has overlooked
perspectives important for the better understanding
and explanation of the managerial incentives to
engage in ﬁnancial misrepresentation and the
underlying processes triggered by this decision.
Arm’s length analysis of ﬁnancial data alone is not
able to reveal such mechanisms and a wider range
of research methods must be deployed to uncover
them.
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Appendix A
Overview of documents and publications consulted
Minutes of meetings
Minutes of the Board of Directors of the SAirgroup and agenda with accompanying documents:
1995–2001 (October)
Minutes of the Management Committee (konzernleitung) of the SAirgroup and agenda with
accompanying documents: 1995–2001 (October)
Minutes of the Finance Committee of the SAirgroup and agenda with accompanying documents:
1995–2001 (August)
Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of the SAirgroup (Ausschus der
Verwaltungsrat): 1996–1999 (April) –Committee was abolished in April 1999 due to the reform
of the Board of Directors
Minutes of the Board of Directors of Sabena and agenda with accompanying documents: 1994–2001
(November)
Minutes of the Management Committee of Sabena and agenda with accompanying: 1994–2001
(November)
Minutes of the Workers’ Council Meetings: 1994–2001 (November)
Minutes of the Steering Committee SAir/Sabena: May 1995–March 1998
Minutes of the Steering Committee Diamond – 1999 (No. 1–No. 9)
Minutes of the AMP (AirlineManagement Partnership) –Management CommitteeMeeting (October
1999–October 2001)
Contracts
Shareholders’ and Master Agreement between the state of Belgium and Swissair Swiss Air Transport
Company LTD – 4 May 1995
Loan Agreement between Société Féderale d’Investissement (Belgium) and Swissair – 24 July 1995
Global Warrant Certiﬁcate and Terms of Warrants – 25 July 1995
Cooperation Agreement between Sabena and Swissair, Swiss Air Transport Company – 24 July 1995
Codeshare beyond Agreement between Swissair and Sabena, 1 June 1997
Frame Agreement between Swissair Swiss Airtransport Ltd and Sabena NV concerning the
cooperation in the area of cargo transportation – 16 December 1996
Cooperation Agreement between Sabena NVand Swisscargo Ltd concerning the cooperation in the
area of cargo transportation – 12 August 1997
Fleet Cooperation Agreement, 18 December 1997 between Swissair, SAirgroup, SR Technics,
Sabena, DAT and Sobelair (the latter two are subsidiaries of Sabena)
Technical Assistance and Service Agreement (TASA) between Sabena and Gate Gourmet
International Ltd (subsidiary of SAirgroup) on 5 February 1997 (relates to catering)
Swissair/ Sabena Airline Management Partnership (legal establishment of the UK partnership) –
Allan & Overy, London, 31 July 2000
Consulting reports
Report prepared on a possible acquisition – Flair Report – (24 May 1994) – McKinsey
Report on a multi-partnership strategy – (3 October 1997) – McKinsey
Several reports on the Hunter Strategy – (30 October 1997, 1 December 1997, 14 January 1998,
3 February 1998)
Several reports on project Diamond – (April 1999, June 1999, December 1999) – McKinsey
Several reports on project Diamond, exclusively on the cost-beneﬁt sharing model under project
Diamond = AMP (July 1999–November 1999) – Roland Berger
Several consultancy reports on AMP (December 1999–January 2000) – McKinsey
AMP – Clean Slate Report – March 2000 – McKinsey
Strategic options for Sabena Technics – 16 September 1997 – McKinsey
Situation of SR/SN prepared for Sabena – 7 November 1997 – McKinsey
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Appendix A
Overview of documents and publications consulted (continued)
Development and Evaluation of Strategic Options – catering – Sabena 26 August 1997 – ICARUS –
consulting AG
Development and Evaluation of Strategic Options – cargo handling – 26 August 1997 – ICARUS –
consulting AG
Strategic Options for Sabena Ground Handling – 16 September 1997 – Mc Kinsey
PWC–Valuation of the maintenance division – Sabena Technics – 1 January 1999
Report for the ﬁnancing of Aircraft – Sabena – March 1999 – Crédit Lyonnais – Transportation
Advisory Group
Selecting the best strategy to value the state participation in Sabena – report for the Board of Directors
of Sabena – November 1999 – Boston Consulting Group
Project Nightﬂy: strategic perspective on shareholder negotiations – (December 1999–March 2000),
– ING Bearings – report ordered by the Minister of Public Companies
Project Daylight – ING Bearings – May 2001
Blue Sky – several consulting reports prepared for Sabena – by the Boston Consulting Group (spring
2000–March 2001).
Warburg Dillon Read – comments on ﬁnancial guidelines of the SAirgroup – 29 September 1999
CSFB – comments on ﬁnancial guidelines of the SAirgroup – November 1999
Project Shield – October 2000 – McKinsey
Risk assessment and strategy – March 2001 – CSFB
Reports of auditors
Management letters of the auditor of Sabena (KPMG) (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000)
Sabena – Opinion on the proposed capital increase – 11 December 2000 – KPMG
Report of STG Coopers and Lybrand to the Finance Committee and to the Board of the SAirgroup
(1995, 1996, 1997)
Management Report of PWC to the Finance Committee and to the Board of the SAirgroup (1998,
1999, 2000)
Financial Exposure Report of PWC to the Board of the SAirgroup – February 2001
Audited results for the half year to 30 June 2001 to the Board of the SAirgroup of KPMG
Prospectuses issued by the SAirgroup
SAirGroup – SAirGroup Finance (NL) B.V. – €400,000, 000 – 4.375% – Guaranteed Bonds due
2006 – Guaranteed by SAirgroup – 11 November 1999
SAirGroup – SAirGroup Finance (NL) B.V. – US $350,000,000 Guaranteed Notes due 2004 –
Guaranteed by SAirgroup – 11 November 1999
Prospekt SAirgroup 2000–2007 von CHF 300,000,000, 41=4%Anleihe (loan) SAirgroup – 25 January
2000
SAirGroup – SAirGroup Finance (NL) B.V. – €400,000,000 – 6.625%. Guaranteed Bonds due 2010
– Guaranteed by SAirgroup – 5 October 2000
Other documents
Correspondence of the CEO, the Secretary General and the legal department of Sabena 1995–2001
The Annual Reports of Swissair/SAirgroup 1945–2000
The Annual Reports of Sabena 1990–2000
Financial Statement Swissair Group for the 6 months ended 30 June 2001
Sabena Development Plan 1998–2000
Sabena Development Plan 2000–2002
Remuneration contracts of CEO Sabena 1996–2000 and 2000–2001, CEO SAirgroup 1996–2000,
CFO SAirgroup 1997–2000, CEO Swissair 1997–1999 (details of the remuneration contracts of
the other SBU CEOs were found in the Ernst & Young Report – complete version)
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Appendix A
Overview of documents and publications consulted (continued)
Bonus and stock option plan SAir-Executives – 1997–2000
Bonus and stock option plan Sabena – Executives – 1999–2000
Press maps of Sabena and SAirgroup – 1995–2001
Reports, documents, articles and books
Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. (2003) ENQUÊTE PARLEMENTAIRE visant à examiner
les circonstances qui ont conduit à la mise en faillite de la Sabena, de déterminer les éventuelles
responsabilités et de formuler des recommandations pour l’avenir. DOC 50 1514/003 and DOC
50 1514/004
Decraene, S., Denruyter P. and Sciot, G. (2002) De crash van Sabena. Leuven, Uitgeverij Van
Halewyck
Lüchinger, R. (2001). SWISSAIR l’histoire secrète de la débâcle. Lausanne, Editions Bilan,
Moser, S. (2001). Bruchlandung, wie die Swissair zugrunde gerichtet wurde Zürich, Orell Füssli
Verlag
Press Report of Ernst and Young ‘Investigation in Sachen Swissair’
Ernst and Young Report – complete version ‘Investigation in Sachen Swissair’ report undertaken at
the request of the administrator of the SAirgroup
Slits, V. (2004). ‘Comment Swissair a pillé la Sabena.’ La Libre Belgique, 17 November 2004, 1: 18–
19.
T.M. and D. M. (2004). ‘La théorie du complot, ou la tentation de réécrire l’histoire.’ Le Temps –
Quotidien Suisse édité à Genève’ 17 November 2004, No. 2034, 3.
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Appendix B
Deﬁnition of ‘control’ in the International Accounting Standards in the 1990s
In the 1990s the deﬁnition of ‘control’ of the International Accounting Standards was embedded in
IAS 22 ‘Business Combinations’ as well as in IAS 27, ‘Consolidated and separated ﬁnancial
statements’. Both deﬁnitions were identical and deﬁned the concept of control as follows: Control is
the power to govern the ﬁnancial and operating policies of an entity so as to obtain beneﬁts from its
activities (IAS 27, para. 4). In order to allow preparers of ﬁnancial statements to judge whether or not
control existed in a relationship between investor and investee the following principles were included
in IAS 22 and IAS 27 (again these principles are identical). These principles are the following
(IAS 27, para. 13).
Control is presumed to exist when the parent owns, directly or indirectly through subsidiaries,
more than half of the voting power of an entity unless, in exceptional circumstances, it can be clearly
demonstrated that such ownership does not constitute control. Control also exists when the parent
owns half or less of the voting power of an entity when there is:
(a) power over more than half of the voting rights by virtue of agreement with other investors;
(b) power to govern the ﬁnancial and operating policies of the entity under a statute or agreement;
(c) power to appoint or remove the majority of the members of the board of directors or equivalent
governing body and control of the entity is by that board or body; or
(d) power to cast the majority of votes at meetings of the Board of Directors or equivalent governing body
and control of the entity is by that board or body.
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Appendix C
Illustration of the impact of the accounting choices of the SAirgroup20
The following accounting methods will be applied to an example of two individual companies, A and
B, whereby A holds an investment in B of 49%. The group accounts will be prepared under three
different sets of accounting choices: set (1) full consolidation, set (2) equity method and set (3) equity
method whereby the investment was written down in the prior year.
Individual
accounts A
Individual
accounts B
Group
accounts –
full
consolidation
Group
accounts –
equity
method
Group
accounts –
equity
method with
write-down
Tangible assets 600 350 950 600 600
Investment 98 85.25***
Current assets 504 175 679 504 504
Total assets 1,202 525 1,629 1,189.25 1,104
Capital 500 200 500 500 500
Reserves 200 200 200 102
Result of the year 50 (25)
Group result 37.75* 37.75 50
Equity 750 175 737.75 737.75 652
Minority
interests
89.25**
Long-term debt 400 250 650 400 400
Trade creditors 52 100 152 52 52
Total liabilities
+ equity
1,202 525 1,629 1,189.75 1,104
Equity/(Equity
+ total debt)
45.27 % 62.00 % 59.00 %
Return on
equity
5.39 % 5.39 % 8.30 %
Return on total
assets
2.31 % 3.17 % 4.50 %
* group result = 50 – 12.25 (= share of the loss of B) = 37.75
** minority interests = 102 – 12.75 = 89.25
*** investment (equity method) 98 – 12.75 = 85.25
20Under full consolidation the investee’s assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses are combined with those of the investor
company, and the minority interest’s equity in net assets and net income are disclosed in the consolidated ﬁnancial
statements. The equity method suppresses the components and reports only the investor’s proportionate share of an investee’s
net assets and net income on the investor’s balance sheet and income statement, respectively. All things being equal, a
company consolidating an equity investment will have more assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses. There is no difference
however in the total stockholders’ equity or net income between full consolidation and the equity method, unless the
investor’s share of losses exceeds the carrying amount of the investment under the equity method (see also IAS 28) or if the
investor had a gain or loss on issuances of stock by an equity investee. The company that can use the equity method, and
avoid consolidation is often able to improve its debt-to-equity ratios, as well as ratios for return on assets and sales (see also
Hartgraves and Benston, 2002: 249–250).
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Appendix D
Communication on the managerial intent of the write-down of Sabena in the books of
the SAirgroup
Translation into English
‘When Swissair will write down the value of its investment in Sabena in its books, this event is
solely an ‘accounting’ event; it does by no means imply that Swissair will divest from Sabena. The
only objective of this operation is to shield the result of the SAirgroup from future losses of
Sabena.’
(Extract from the letter of the Secretary General of Sabena with approval of the CEO of SABENA in
order to respond to questions raised by members of the Belgian parliament – 19 March 1997)
‘From an accounting point of view, this write-down allows a company not to include any longer its
share in the losses or proﬁts in the investee. From a strategic point of view, this write-down does
not imply a sale of the Sabena investment nor a withdrawal.’
(Extract from a letter of the Secretary General of Sabena with consent of the CEO of Sabena to the
Cabinet of the Belgian Minister of Transport – 15 March 1997)
Original French text
‘S’il est possible que Swissair amortisse la valeur de sa participation en SABENA, il est acquis
qu’un telle opération purement comptable n’entraînera en aucune manière le retrait de Swissair.
Cette opération aurait pour seul objectif de ne plus faire intervenir les résultats de la SABENA dans
la consolidation des résultats du groupe.’
(Extract from the letter of the Secretary General of Sabena with approval of the CEO of SABENA in
order to response to questions raised by members of the Belgian Parliament – 19 March 1997)
‘Sur le plan comptable, l’amortissement d’une participation permet à une entreprise de ne plus
devoir consolider cette participation, et donc de ne plus inclure dans ses résultats les proﬁts ou les
pertes de cette participation – Sur le plan stratégique, cet amortissement ne signiﬁe pas une vente
ou un retrait’
(Extract from a letter of the Secretary General of Sabena with consent of the CEO of Sabena to the
Cabinet of the Minister of Transport – 15 March 1997.)
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Appendix E
‘Agreement of the 2nd of August 2001 between the Belgian State, the SAirgroup and Sabena
Article 6.3
The parties and their respective subsidiaries mutually, irrevocably and deﬁnitively waive any and all
rights or claims, actual or potential, which they may have against each other and each other’s
directors, ofﬁcers, employees, agents and representatives for funding or other obligations or liabilities
in relation to (i) any decision adopted or actions taken by the Board of Directors of Sabena prior to the
date hereof regarding the renewal or expansion of Sabena’s ﬂeet; (ii) any transfer of assets or
provision of services between Sabena or any of its subsidiaries and SAirgroup or any of its
subsidiaries prior to the date hereof which purportedly was not effected on arm’s length terms or
otherwise not in the best interest of any said parties; (iii) any decisions adopted or actions taken prior
to the date hereof which purportedly deprived Sabena or SAirgroup or any of their respective
subsidiaries from a corporate opportunity; and (iv) any purported acts or conduct prior to the date
hereof as de facto director (‘‘administrateur de fait’’) of Sabena.’
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